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Abstract 
 
A recurring theme in debates on the future of Iraq is that the state is facing an 
imminent civil war among ethnic Kurds, Turkmens and Arabs, and among the 
Sunni and Shi’a Muslim sects. As tensions continue to escalate, the Iraqi 
media will play a crucial role in these developments. The pluralization of a 
private media sector in post-Ba’athist Iraq has serve as a positive 
development in Iraq’s post-war transition, yet this has also allowed for the 
emergence of local media that are forming along ethno-sectarian lines. The 
Iraqi media have evolved to a stage where they now have the capability of 
reinforcing the country’s ethno-sectarian divisions. This policy paper examines 
the evolution and current state of Iraq’s media and offer recommendations to 
local Iraqi actors, as well as regional and international organizations as to how 
the media can counter employment of negative images and stereotypes of 
other ethno-sectarian communities and influence public attitudes in 
overcoming such tensions in Iraqi society. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Few analyses of the Iraqi media have been conducted despite the emergence 
of hundreds of newspapers and several satellite channels in the nation, in 
stark contrast to the five state owned dailies and single satellite channel that 
existed during the Ba’ath era. This policy paper addresses the need for a 
proactive analysis of the Iraqi media and its portrayal of ethno-sectarian 
differences in Iraqi society. Before offering policy recommendations, it is 
important to describe the media scene itself: What media is owned by political 
ethno-sectarian factions? How are ethno-sectarian differences and conflicts, 
both rhetorical and violent, represented in the Iraqi media? Do media outlets 
exacerbate Iraq’s ethno-sectarian relations? Are there any Iraqi media outlets 
seeking to address these relations in a positive manner? What kind of 
programs are Iraqis watching? What efforts are there to provide a space for 
the public to communicate and express its grievances? Do the media try to 
produce local entertainment, as compared to relying on foreign entertainment 
for Iraqis to “escape” the grim realities of daily life in their country? What 
recommendations can be made to ensure that Iraq’s media serves a 
constructive role in its post-war dynamics, rather than serving as an element 
that exacerbates the state’s current internal tensions? 
Observers of the situation in Iraq often predict the nation faces an 
imminent civil war among ethnic Kurds and Arabs, and among the Sunni and 
Shi’a Muslim sects, while others argue this civil war has already begun. 
Differences between various ethnic and sectarian groups have been ever-
present in Iraq, but they were rarely articulated in official, public debate, nor 
used as a basis by politicians, religious and community leaders to criticize the 
others. Even in Ba’athist Iraq, while members of every community may have 
suffered discrimination, at least the media rarely employed the terms “Shi’a,” 
“Sunni” and “Kurd” in a negative manner as it would harm national unity. 
Following the 2003 Iraq war, the emerging media mentioned such ethnic and 
sectarian terms for Iraq’s people, but in the context of calling for national unity. 
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However, the debates prior to the adoption of the Iraqi Constitution in October 
2005 and the December 2005 election of a permanent Iraqi Assembly marked 
an emerging trend in Iraq’s politics - its divisive ethnic and sectarian discourse 
that has now proliferated into the media. Following the February 2006 
bombing of the revered Shi’a Al-‘Askariyya shrine in the city of Samarra, a 
spiral of violence consumed the center of Iraq, including Baghdad where 
sectarian killings between Arab Sunni and Arab Shi’a groups have become 
daily phenomena. These tensions manifest themselves in the political sphere, 
as certain Arab Shi’a parties have advocated a federal entity in the 
predominantly Shi’a south as means of separating themselves from the 
violence ridden center. Another conflict that receives scant attention is that of 
the future of the oil rich city of Kirkuk, contested by Arabs, Kurds and 
Turkmens, and often resulting in violent clashes. This conflict also represents 
itself in the political sphere, as Kurdish parties have called for placing Kirkuk 
under their federal jurisdiction, which Arab and Turkmen communities oppose. 
Private Iraq media, with ownership in the hands of competing political 
factions, have emerged in post-war Iraq, reflecting the country’s conflicting 
ethno-sectarian agendas. At the same time, media have also emerged 
independent of Iraq’s political mosaic, and seek to provide a public space for 
education, entertainment and cathartic release for the daily violence that 
dominates Iraqi public life. 
The media has taken on a public advocacy role as well, pressing policy 
makers to address deficiencies and shortcomings in providing security and 
infrastructure needs, by highlighting these problems, and giving Iraqi citizens 
a platform to express their views. Ethno-sectarian channels conduct public 
advocacy as well, but primarily on behalf of their communities. 
The media in Iraq cannot isolate itself from global trends in international 
media, and Iraqis can watch media produced outside of the region, ranging 
from the British series “Mr. Bean” to cartoons, music shows and films 
produced in the Arab World or the US. The desire for Iraqis to produce 
content that reflects their aspirations has resulted in the adaptation of several 
foreign program formats, such as reality TV, to a local Iraqi context. These 
Iraqi entertainment programs can provide an alternative to the “Iraq” that the 
Iraqis usually witness on TV; that of the news depicting unrelenting violence in 
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their country. The literature on conflict resolution and the media stresses that 
entertainment programming is one method to reduce tensions in deeply 
divided society. Both state and private media can play important roles in using 
entertainment for this goal. 
Though this study focuses on the content of local Iraqi media, regional 
channels are also important to the story. Although data on the rate of 
consumption of local Iraqi media or regional channels are not yet available, 
there were general observable trends in how the Iraqis consumed media 
based on the author’s experience in the country. Satellite dishes were 
forbidden under the Ba’athist government, and many Iraqis sought to 
purchase them after the war ended in 2003. At this time, Al-Jazeera and Al-
Arabiyya were the only outlets for regional news free of state control and 
ironically, for domestic Iraqi news. Due to Iran’s proximity, the Iranian Arabic- 
language Al-‘Alam was able to broadcast terrestrially into Iraq and could be 
picked up by television sets without the need for a costly satellite dish. By 
2004 and 2005 two trends were emerging in Iraq vis-à-vis the regional 
channels. First, certain Iraqis, including those politicians in the transitional 
government, were offended that the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya referred to 
the Iraqi insurgents as the “Iraqi resistance” (al-muqawwama al-‘iraqiyya) thus 
bestowing on them some sort of regional legitimacy. Second, Iraqis desired 
news and entertainment created by Iraqis, reflecting their concerns and 
desires. 
Iraqi channels proliferated within the period of 2004 to 2005, but were 
often unprofessional in terms of news coverage, forcing many Iraqis to 
continue to depend on the regional channels for news. At the same time, a 
number of Iraqis were also growing tired of the ethno-sectarian nature of the 
Iraqi media, and preferred getting their information from these Arab satellite 
channels, which did not have the “ethno-sectarian” commentary that usually 
accompanied the news on Iraqi channels. 
A professional and independent media that can allow views expressed by 
all of Iraq’s communities is an important step towards establishing a viable 
democracy. Nevertheless, in a country relatively new to independent media, 
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freedom of expression can be abused.1 This paper concludes that Iraq’s 
ethno-sectarian media are providing the psychological groundwork for bitter 
divisiveness and conflict, with one channel already making direct exhortations 
for violence against other Iraqi communities. It also concludes that the media 
need to be addressed for the sake of Iraq’s long term stability. Media divided 
along ethno-sectarian lines have the potential to further the gap between 
Iraq’s communities and weaken any kind of national belonging. Whether the 
state of Iraq will survive division is debatable, but the nation is already on a 
course of partition in terms of identity, helped by media which encourage this 
trend. 
It is urgent to address these matters before more political factions decide 
to use their media as mouthpieces to exacerbate the conflict, whipping up 
ethnic and sectarian feelings or even directing the conflict. So far, most 
political factions have used their media to stress unity among Iraq’s 
communities, but they nevertheless have the potential to instigate conflict with 
these means if it suits their interests. The ultimate aim of this policy paper is to 
address this growing problem in Iraq: how the media exacerbates cleavages 
in Iraqi society, and how, rather, it can be used to facilitate a positive attitude 
in bridging the differences among its communities. 
1.2 Methodology 
An overview and assessment of the media in Iraq is needed, and it is 
crucial to reflect the literature of media in other deeply-divided societies. This 
policy paper will examine ownership and financing of the various media and 
how that is linked with the ethno-sectarian discourse emerging in Iraq. It is 
based on hours of viewing the programs of Iraqi satellite channels, 
supplemented by interviews with Iraqi journalists and questionnaires delivered 
                                            
1
 An important study in this subject in the Balkans is Izabella Karlowicz’s “The Difficult Birth of 
the Fourth Estate: Media Development and Democracy Assistance in Post-Conflict Balkans,” 
in Miklos Sukosd and Peter Bajomi-Lazar eds., Reinventing Media: Media Policy Reform in 
East-Central Europe (Budapest: Central European University Center for Policy Studies, 
2003). 
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to the channels. Rather than focusing solely on newspapers or terrestrial 
channels, this project examines prominent TV stations that happen to 
broadcast both terrestrially and via satellite. According to various surveys, 
more than 90% of Iraqis receive most of their information, whether it is news 
or entertainment, from satellite TV stations. According to one statement in a 
report on the Iraqi media, “Many people do not buy newspapers because the 
satellite channels communicate every single piece of news.”2 The proliferation 
of Iraqi channels that broadcast by satellite also demonstrates another 
important factor: media owners are sending their messages to local Iraqi 
audiences, the Arab world and the large Iraqi diaspora, which still provides 
financial support for many of Iraq’s political parties. 
This policy report is based on four sets of data: 
• An investigation of which independent and political factions own the TV 
media in Iraq (with a brief overview of their print and radio media). 
• Questionnaires distributed to Iraqi media in coordination with the 
Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research in London.33 
• An analysis of programming content dealing with entertainment, locally 
produced and imported. 
• A discourse/content analysis of programming of the stations deemed as 
having a potential for affecting ethno-sectarian tensions. 
 
The last set of data provides most of the information for this policy paper. 
Examining the programs and their content helps determine the priorities and 
audiences for these stations. The analysis examines media content beginning 
with a national event that had ramifications for all of Iraq's communities: the 
bombing of the Shi’a Muslim Al-‘Askariyya shrine in the city of Samarra, in 
February 2006. Iraqis attribute the spark in intense inter-communal conflict in 
                                            
2
 International Media Support, “Media Development in Post-war Iraq Report,” April 2003, p. 
16. 
3
 The author would like to thank Douglas Griffin of the Stanhope Centre for Communications 
Policy Research and Professor Monroe Price, Susan Abbott, Sylvie Beauvais and Libby 
Morgan of the Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for 
Communication, University of Pennsylvania for their assistance in providing information and 
insight. 
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Iraq to this event, and at this juncture a sample of prominent Iraqi media 
representing all societal groups had emerged. 
The programming content of various Iraqi satellite channels was analyzed 
by “frames” the stations used. In the context of this paper I have used Snow 
and Benford’s definition of a frame: “an interpretive schemata that simplifies 
and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding 
objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within 
one’s present or past environment.”44 By watching satellite media channels in 
Iraq, the analysis seeks to determine how prominent Iraqi media, both political 
and independent, frames ethno-sectarian violence. 
1.3 The Target Audience 
The state of the Iraqi media provides the need for offering recommendations 
to address three areas: media regulation, media education, and media 
institutions. The policy recommendations are directed to actors on the local 
and international level. 
On the local level, this report seeks to address the Iraqi regulatory body, 
the Communications and Media Commission of Iraq (CMC), the Iraqi National 
Assembly and policy makers involved with the media. On a societal level in 
Iraq, this paper addresses educational facilities, such as Baghdad University’s 
Department of Communications, as well as journalist associations in Iraq. It 
also addresses international donors, including foreign ministries and NGOs 
who have had experience in providing aid to media in post-conflict societies, 
as well as organizations such as UNDP and UNESCO, which have 
experience with the Iraqi media. 
This policy paper also targets an audience of policy makers and non-
governmental organizations who simply seek to gain a broader understanding 
of the underlying dynamics of the ongoing violence in Iraq. To this general 
audience interested in Iraqi affairs, this report seeks to demonstrate that 
                                            
4
 D.A. Snow and R. Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,” in A.D. Morris and C.M. 
Mueller, eds., Frontiers in Social Movement Theor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) 
p. 137. 
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violence in Iraq is not simply fought on the streets, but is represented in the 
tele-visual and thus socio-cultural sphere. In this regard, the paper 
demonstrates how the media’s public advocacy programs serve as an 
alternative means of political participation in Iraq, and how various forms of 
entertainment serve as alternatives to violent media in Iraq, as well as a 
possible means of overcoming divisions in Iraqi society. 
1.4 Defining the Problem of Media and Conflict 
The media have the capability of affecting vast audiences and in a time of 
conflict become important actors, at times on par with the actual combatants 
themselves. Media often serve as a means of transmitting hostility, directly or 
indirectly, whether it is between states or ethnic groups, and can exacerbate 
tensions by spreading misperceptions or exaggerations. The question that first 
needs to be answered is whether conflict media, or in other words media that 
engender conflict, can emerge from within the Iraqi context. 
According to the conflict resolution literature, the constructive 
transformation of a conflict can only occur if it affects the mentalities of either 
an individual or a society. The media have the potential to play a significant 
role in this transformation, by building confidence among the parties and 
challenging misperceptions. However, this is the exception rather than the 
norm. While a review of the literature on media and conflict resolution (a 
sample is provided in the “References” section) demonstrates isolated cases 
where the media have had a constructive role in a conflict, in most cases the 
media have exacerbated conflict rather than resolved it, and the case of 
Rwanda illustrates one of the most extreme scenarios. 
Have the media in Iraq reached a point where they can be characterized 
as conflict media? To answer this question I have appropriated a model from 
the Rwanda context, as that is the case that has most vividly demonstrated 
the role of media and conflict. Radio Rwanda, a state-controlled station, was 
used by the Hutu-dominated government to mobilize troops and ordinary 
citizens against the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front in the nineties. At the same 
time, another radio entity was emerging, backed by the Rwandan President’s 
close circles and militias, practicing undisguised hate-speech against the 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
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Tutsi. Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) emerged as a private 
radio station, financed by individuals who had high level positions in the 
government before and during the genocide. RTLM played a direct role in the 
killings of moderate Hutus and Tutsis by broadcasting information on where to 
manage road-blocks, identifying individuals who were supposed to be 
eliminated, giving their address and license plates, inviting listeners to give 
information to help find specific persons, and asking Hutus to join their militias. 
The relation between Radio Rwanda, whose owners, editors and journalists 
were also involved in the establishment of RTLM, has some ramifications for 
the Iraqi context. Extremist elements in Rwanda were able to infiltrate the 
official state media, while keeping their own private media as well. The author 
does not want to suggest that a Rwanda-like genocide can occur in Iraq, but 
rather seeks to illustrate the structural similarities between the media in both 
countries. 
Four factors are developed in an International Media Support (IMS) Report 
to explain the emergence of a conflict media in Rwanda.5 These four factors 
can be adapted to any scenario  where conflict and media are intertwined, and 
I have adopted the IMS model for Iraq by placing the factors in sequential 
order. In other words, I argue that a process needs to occur for media to 
evolve into conflict media. 
• a strong ideology 
• control over a mass medium/media 
• psychological preparation to hate 
• a call to violence 
 
The first factor, a strong ideology, is propagated by prominent academics, 
journalists or politicians who develop theories of their ethnic or sectarian 
group. Such theories in the media portray their group as a “stronger race,” and 
“a race with a glorious past,” or as “victims” who have to unite in order to deal 
with a threat posed by other groups so that they will not be “eliminated” from 
the political process or “annihilated” from within the state altogether. In the 
                                            
5
 Monique Alexis and Ines Mpambara, “IMS Assessment Mission: The Rwanda Media 
Experience from the Genocide,” International Media Support Report, 2003. 
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final case, violence conducted by one community against the other is 
portrayed as a “matter of self-defense.” 
Once an ideology is framed, there is a need to articulate it, which brings in 
the second factor: control over strong mass media to disseminate the 
message. In these media outlets, journalists and editors are in many 
instances non-professionals whose priority is advocating an agenda rather 
than informing the public. The spread of a conflict media is a key step in 
conflict escalation. According to the conflict resolution literature, differences 
between ethnic and sectarian groups are not in themselves a precursor to 
conflict. Rather, it is the leaders or political movements representing the ethnic 
and sectarian groups who mobilize their communities to “gear up” for a 
conflict. In this conflict escalation process, control over mass media is 
essential. 
The third step, after a faction consolidates both an ideology and control 
over a media outlet, is the most crucial. It is this step - the psychological 
preparation to hate, which seeks to prepare the audience for a violent conflict 
- where the media are transformed into a tool of conflict. Such preparations 
include misinformation, as an uninformed audience is easier to manipulate. 
Usually rumors or conspiracies are presented as the opinion of the “ordinary 
man” of that particular ethnic or sectarian group. This preparation also seeks 
to sow division, by framing peace with other groups as “impossible” and 
framing those who seek reconciliation as “traitors.” This step also seeks to use 
demonizing frames of the opponent through dehumanizing the other group or 
groups. 
The fourth factor in the emergent conflict media begins when it makes 
direct exhortations to violence. The media emerges with the omni-presence of 
violent frames. “Enemy,” “accomplice,” “traitor,” “massacre,” and “murder” are 
examples of violent frames, and lists of killed victims are framed as “victories,” 
while the perpetrators of massacres would be deemed as “heroes,” which 
would encourage even more killings. This policy paper seeks to address 
where the Iraqi media falls within this framework and how recommendations 
can be made to prevent the Iraqi media from being transformed into a conflict 
media. We now turn to the Iraq media scene to analyze its evolution in terms 
of the conflict-related evaluative grid. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 14 
 
2. OWNERSHIP, PROGRAMMING AND 
CONTENT IN IRAQI MEDIA 
Ethno-sectarian “media empires” have formed in Iraq and are a quite 
pervasive element in Iraq’s Fourth Estate. The extent of these media empires 
are illustrated in the appendix, to demonstrate how powerful media have 
coalesced around ethno-political groups in Iraq who have print, radio and TV 
communications at their disposal. Ethnic factions among the Arabs, Kurds and 
Turkmens, and religious-sectarian factions among the Sunni, Shi’a and 
Christians all have their own means of communicating to their ethno-sectarian 
constituencies in Iraq and abroad in the Iraqi diaspora. Independent media, 
with no ethno-sectarian affiliation, exist, but do not have access to the funds 
that the political parties can provide. If Iraq is to truly consolidate democratic 
foundations, its media will need to include objective and independent outlets 
that represent a broad spectrum of Iraq’s society. By dividing Iraq’s media into 
five categories, I seek to assess if the Iraqi media is furthering democratic 
consolidation or becoming an arena for the political ethno-sectarian divisions 
in the country. I categorized the Iraqi media into the following: 
• media owned by the Iraqi state 
• media owned by political Islamist groups (religious/sectarian factions) 
• media owned by ethnic political parties 
• media owned by entities calling for violence 
• media owned by independent entities 
 
The findings of this policy paper are based on the programs and media 
content of a selection of Iraqi satellite channels that represent each of these 
five groups. The programming and media content of news, political, socio-
cultural, religious programming and entertainment are analyzed. 
The first section analyzes the channel’s representation of issues of 
ethnicity and portrayal of differences between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen. 
Additionally the coverage of Islam, particularly political Islam in Iraq, is 
examined to analyze whether the media’s portrayals exacerbate sectarian 
Shi’a-Sunni divisions. 
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The second section looks at how violence in Iraq is reported and whether 
the channels encourage violence among Iraq’s various groups, or whether 
they seek to bridge the differences. 
Third, channels are examined as to whether they may provide an 
alternative space for overcoming differences amongst Iraq’s divisions. This 
section examines how some channels provide a space for civic involvement in 
political affairs through various talk shows and call in programs. In this area, 
channels often serve a public advocacy role, by providing a means to present 
the citizen’s demands to the government. 
Finally, the fourth section examines how the channels appropriate foreign 
genres in a local context and how they contribute to democratic consolidation 
or ethno-sectarian division. It will also examine what channels are resistant to 
foreign programming, while others import foreign programs, both political and 
entertainment. 
3. STATE OWNED MEDIA 
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq established the Iraqi Media 
Network (IMN). In its initial phases the Network included a terrestrial TV 
channel, two radio stations, and the Al-Sabah newspaper. The IMN faced two 
challenges. The first was to demonstrate that it could serve as a public service 
broadcaster, serving as the voice of all Iraqis. The second was to establish a 
satellite channel that had the broadcast infrastructure and lively and 
informative programming to compete with the regional satellite channels being 
watched in Iraq, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya, and the Iranian based 
Arabic language channel, Al-‘Alam. In this regard, the IMN was restructured 
into the Al-Iraqiyya network and expanded to two terrestrial TV channels and 
the Al-Iraqiyya satellite channel. The satellite channel began transmissions in 
May 2003. While it was first broadcasted from the morning to the evening, it 
now broadcasts 24 hours a day. It is the only national public service channel; 
its financing comes from the coffers of the Iraqi state, and the Ministry of 
Finance approves the channel’s budget. 
The development of Al-Iraqiyya reflected the evolution of Iraq’s post-war 
political process. In its initial phases, the channel was used by the CPA as a 
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means to communicate with the Iraqis, and thus considered a tool of 
“American propaganda.” It eventually established itself as a channel free of 
US editorial interference, but then began to reflect the agenda of the interim 
Iraqi government of Iyad ‘Allawi, who attempted to co-opt the channel to 
support his party in the January 2005 election. Given that the current 
government in Iraq is dominated by an alliance of Shi’a Islamist groups, 
known as the United Iraqi Alliance, and an alliance of ethnic Kurdish groups 
known as the Kurdish Coalition, the station has an inherent Shi’a-Kurdish 
bias, according to its critics. In the past, the station rarely showed news 
conferences of leading Sunni Islamist political parties and ethnic Turkmen 
complained of a predominantly pro-Kurdish bias. The station has tried to 
address these issues by allowing more of its content to be devoted to Arab 
Sunni and Turkmen guests, who use the channel to express their grievances, 
if not criticize the government directly. Since Iraq’s majority population is 
Shi’a, the station reflects this sectarian group’s majority status by featuring the 
Shi’a call to prayer.6 
In its depictions of violence in Iraq, the station reflects a pro-government 
line. For example, the content of Al-Iraqiyya’s programming tends to feature 
mostly pro-government frames that stress “optimism” in the progress being 
made in “reconstruction” and “security.” The operations of the Iraqi security 
forces are highlighted, giving viewers the impression that they are taking an 
active policy in quelling insurgent and sectarian violence, a key frame that 
seeks to buttress the legitimacy of the Iraqi state itself. The channel usually 
has access to live footage of Iraqi government military campaigns, which 
serves as an additional reminder to Al-Iraqiyya’s audience that the state is in 
fact taking action against the violence in Iraq. Members of the Iraqi security 
forces killed in action are referred to as “martyrs” (shuhuda’). The 
predominantly American forces in Iraq are usually referred to as “Coalition” or 
“Multi-national Forces” and the insurgents are usually called “terrorists” 
                                            
6
 The crucial difference between this call to prayer is the inclusion of an additional line 
referring to ‘Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shi’a Muslim Imam. 
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(irhabiun).7 Supposedly random interviews with people on the street are 
designed to give the impression of public condemnation of the “terrorists’” 
activities in Iraq. Al-Iraqiyya also seeks to frame state violence as legitimate 
by featuring public service announcements calling upon the Iraqi public to 
volunteer information on the “terrorists.” 
One of the programs on Al-Iraqiyya is the show “Terrorism in the Hands of 
Justice,” which is a show that depicts violence in Iraq. The proceedings are 
filmed live in a courtroom setting where those accused of taking part in “acts 
of terrorism” deliver live confessions. The stage seeks to represent the state 
which is taking concrete steps to crack down on the violence. The program 
shows confessions of insurgents who admit that they are working for financial 
motives, in other words to depict them as “criminals” opposed to a “legitimate 
national resistance.” However the show has ramifications for Iraq’s inter-
communal violence. An account writes of the show, “On one episode an 
interrogator accused the members of important Sunni tribes—the Juburi, 
Janabi, and Duleimi—of all being terrorists. The show only heightened Sunni 
fears that the Shia security forces were targeting them en masse.”8 
Al-Iraqiyya also accuses its competition, the other regional satellite 
channels, of stimulating the ongoing violence in Iraq, a direct 
acknowledgement by the state’s public broadcaster of the power of TV to 
incite violence. In January 2006, the channel reported that the “suggestive 
material” of “certain” satellite channels had the potential to incite viewers to 
“conduct criminal and terrorist acts.” Al-Iraqiyya did not specify whether it was 
referring to pan-Arab channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya, or local channels 
inside of Iraq. The station’s news program interviewed Iraqi psychologists who 
                                            
7
 Those taking part in the violence in Iraq against Coalition forces, the Iraqi government and 
civilians have been referred to as either “resistance fighters,” “terrorists” or “foreign jihadists.” 
For the sake of this article, the term used most often in the media on Iraq, “insurgent” has 
been employed. The term is by no means neutral however. It was the same term that British 
authorities in the twenties used to refer to those Iraqis taking part in the 1920 revolt against 
the UK’s role in the Mandate of Iraq. 
8
 Nir Rosen, “Anatomy of a Civil War: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos,” Boston Review, 
November/December 2006, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR31.6/rosen.html. 
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stated the other channels had the capability of influencing its viewers to 
conduct violence. 
Al-Iraqiyya attempts to minimize the differences between Iraq’s Sunni and 
Shi’a by broadcasting live coverage of Friday sermons where religious leaders 
from both communities preach against the nation’s sectarian divide and stress 
“Iraqi unity.” It also holds televised meetings between Shi’a and Sunni leaders 
as a means of inter-sectarian dialogue. Even music videos are imbued with 
lyrics and images with Iraqi nationalist themes. 
Al-Iraqiyya also provides a space for Iraq’s citizens to interact and 
communicate with politicians and/or the government, providing an alternative 
for the acts of violence that are in themselves protests against the Iraqi state. 
Shows such as “The Iraqi Podium” allow for a live call-in segment where 
viewers can direct questions about political affairs to the guests, ranging from 
various civil society leaders to journalists, academics and intellectuals. For 
example, the program “Open Encounter” hosts government officials and 
political leaders to discuss elections, military operations and the agendas of 
various Iraqi political parties, with studio audience participation. Corruption, a 
topic rarely discussed on state channels in the Arab world, is addressed on 
programs such as “You and the Official.” Other programs deal with local 
socio-economic issues: in “The People’s Concerns,” the viewer can phone in 
to express their opinions on government corruption and unemployment. “Al-
Iraqiyya with You” serves as a forum for public advocacy where the hosts of 
the program seek to capture on film the poverty and unemployment among 
the Iraqis and then call upon the Iraqi government to address these social 
problems. Al-Iraqiyya seems to be moving toward a role as public service 
broadcaster, rather than an official state channel owned by a Ministry of 
Information as in most Arab states.9 
                                            
9
 For those who can read Arabic, a link to all the Iraqi channels (and their programs) 
discussed in this policy paper can be found on the project’s website 
http://www.policy.hu/almarashi/. Otherwise detailed English summaries of these satellite 
channels and their programs can be obtained via BBC Monitoring or the Open Source Center 
(OSC). 
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Given Al-Iraqiyya’s role as a public service broadcaster, most of its shows 
deal with politics, economics, social issues or religion. It used to broadcast 
older Egyptian dramas in its beginning phases, but does not import as much 
foreign programming as the independent channels or even the more secular 
Kurdish and Turkmen owned stations. 
4. MEDIA OWNED BY POLITICAL 
ISLAMISTS 
4.1 Arab Shi’a Media 
All the Shi’a political parties operate their own radio stations, newspapers and 
satellite channels. The strongest Shi’a parties dealt with in this study are 
political Islamist groups that seek a greater role for Islam in the state and 
public life, though they may differ on matters of how large a role Islam should 
play in Iraq. The four prominent Shi’a Islamist political factions include the 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Al-Da’wa 
Party, the Sadr Trend of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Iraqi Hizbullah.10 
The Al-Furat satellite channel, based in Baghdad, began broadcasting in 
November 2004. SCIRI owns and finances the channel and it is run by 
‘Ammar ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the son of the party’s leader. 
The dominant frames on Al-Furat are the “progress” SCIRI is making as 
the largest constituent party in the Iraqi government in terms of 
“reconstruction” and providing “security.” Therefore, the channel’s content 
supports the government, as well as the possibility of a federal Iraq. It marks 
victimization in terms of attacks by Sunni Arab militants referred to as “takfiri.” 
“Takfiri” is a euphemistic term that literally means, “those who condemn others 
as ‘unbelievers,’” and usually refers to members of the Al-Qa’ida Organization 
in Iraq, or in general foreign volunteers from the Arab world who came to Iraq 
                                            
10
 Each of these factions also owns various newspapers, radio stations, and terrestrial TV 
channels, such as SCIRI’s Ghadir TV, the Da’wa Party’s Al-Masar TV, the Sadr Trend’s Al-
Salam TV and Ayatullah Sayyid Hadi al-Mudarissi’s short lived Ahl al-Bayt TV. 
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to combat the US and Iraqi security forces. Nevertheless, Iraqi Sunni Arabs 
argue the term is used as a justification for operations against their community 
for allegedly giving tacit or overt support for their co-religionists fighting in Iraq. 
Since Al-Furat is owned by SCIRI, a Shi’a political Islamist group, much of 
its programming is religious, but the channel does not focus on issues of 
ethnicity and avoids direct references to the Shi’a as a distinct religious group. 
Rather, the channel emphasizes Iraqi unity based on an inclusive Iraqi Muslim 
identity. In other words, the channel tries to gloss over the ethnic differences 
between Arabs and Kurds, and stresses the unity of Islam in Iraq, both Shi’a 
and Sunni. The news program rarely refers to Iraq as part of the “Arab world” 
as do other Arab Sunni or independent Iraqi satellite channels. 
Religious programs include “The Talk of Friday,” which interviews religious 
figures, and a cartoon show with Islamist themes, “The Most Virtuous People 
on Earth.” The station has coverage of Friday sermons, primarily from Shi’a 
mosques. The channel also prominently features the activities of the leader of 
SCIRI, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim. During the run up to the December 15, 2005 
elections for the permanent National Assembly, Al-Furat featured campaign 
ads only for the Shi’a coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, and not for other 
parties. As part of its religious programming, women presenters on this 
channel don the Islamic headscarf. 
Given that SCIRI is dominant in the government, this channel tends to 
frame violence in Iraq with a pro-government stance, just as the Al-Iraqiyya 
channel does. Since members of SCIRI have a prominent role in the armed 
forces, the channel prominently features the role of the “security forces” and 
their efforts to “eliminate terrorism” in Iraq by reporting on their activities in the 
first few minutes of the news programming as well as by providing extended 
coverage of security operations. When some of these security forces were 
implicated in a scandal involving the Ministry of Interior (headed by a SCIRI 
member) maintaining a secret underground prison, these incidents were 
played down on the Al-Furat channel. The channel has also featured speakers 
who have criticized other Arab states for failing to condemn the violence 
committed by “terrorists” in Iraq. Promotional ads on the channel also serve to 
condemn the violence. One ad features what appears to be a handwritten 
note by a child in Arabic, with a stick figure of a child looking at another stick 
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figure of what appears to be an angry insurgent. The text of the note reads: “I 
wish I could stop you. If I were bigger and stronger, I would not let you destroy 
my country. I would hand you over to the police because you are bad, and 
Iraq needs everything you have stolen from it.” 
Coverage of inter-sectarian violence against Iraqi Shi’a Muslims are 
prevalent in Al-Furat’s coverage, although the station does not advocate 
revenge but rather patience and obedience to those Shi’a leaders who have 
called for restraint. 
The channel frames a federated Iraq (one of the primary political platforms 
of SCIRI) as a positive development, and calls on all Iraqi communities to 
unite 
Public advocacy programs include a live call in program “Al-Furat and the 
People,” and “Al-Furat Reports,” an investigative show which deals with 
domestic issues affecting the lives of everyday Iraqis. “Deported in The 
Homeland” covers internally displaced families who have relocated due to 
sectarian violence. It can be gleaned from the interviews that most of the 
victims in this show are Shi’a gathered from their last names or when they 
express certain phrases primarily used by Shi’a in Iraq. While the channel has 
a distinct Shi’a leaning, songs in between programs support peace and unity 
among Iraq’s various ethnic and sectarian communities. 
Al-Furat’s programs are mostly religious. It does not feature popular 
entertainment shows such as Arabic dubbed Latin American soap operas, 
Hollywood films, or music videos from Arabic pop-stars. 
4.2 Arab Sunni Media 
The Arab Sunni Islamist factions developed political associations relatively 
(than which other groups?) later in Iraq’s post-war dynamics. A mistaken 
assumption prevalent in external discourses on Iraq is that Iraqi Sunni Arabs 
dominated the Ba’ath Party, even though Kurds and Shi’a made up some of 
its leadership and party cadres. Iraqi Sunni Arabs, however, were also 
involved in forming exile organizations, such as the Islamist Iraqi Islamic 
Party, and many of them returned to Iraq to represent their constituencies in 
post-war Iraq. In addition to the Iraqi Islamic Party (is this right?), other 
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prominent Sunni groups include the General Dialogue Conference, 
Association of Muslim Scholars (technically not a political party), and the 
Unified National Movement. These parties coalesced into the Al-Tawafuq 
Front. The satellite channels that represent the front’s political agenda are the 
Rafidayn Channel and The Baghdad Satellite Channel. The latter began to 
transmit in August 2005 and will be the focus here. The channel depends on 
advertising primarily from the Arab Sunni community, but also receives 
advertising revenues from the Sunni political parties in Iraq. 
A dominant frame on this channel is “resistance” to the US military forces, 
referred to as “occupation forces.” It also views a future federated Iraq as a 
“foreign scheme” to divide the nation, reflecting Arab Sunni fears of Kurdish 
and Shi’a entities in the north and south of Iraq, respectively, that would leave 
them in a landlocked rump state. Another prominent frame is that of the Arab 
Sunni as the victims at the hands of “militias” that are linked to the 
government or have “infiltrated” the security forces. Given the channel’s 
sympathies to the Al-Tawafuq Front, it only featured campaign advertisements 
for the Front during the Iraqi elections in December 2005, and carries live 
press conferences of the Front. Such sympathies manifest themselves in a 
news program that features the headlines from various Iraqi newspapers with 
Sunni Arab Islamist tendencies. Islamist themes are also evidenced by 
anchorwomen who don the head scarf, as in the SCIRI’s al-Furat channel. 
Religious programming includes “Explaining the Holy Quran,” where Arab 
Sunni clerics offer religious interpretations of the sacred text, “In the Shadow 
of the Shari’a,” discussing topics on Islamic law, and “Fatwas on the Air,” 
which examines various religious rulings. Political programs feature a mix of 
guests, including government officials, but mostly feature Arab Sunni 
politicians. 
The station’s view of violence in Iraq is also the same as the Front’s in that 
it opposes the American military forces stationed in the country, which the 
station refers to as “occupation forces.” Unlike Al-Iraqiyya or Al-Furat this 
station refers to insurgents as “armed men” rather than “terrorists.” 
The channel also has programs for Iraqis to express themselves, many of 
whom vent their frustrations over unemployment and the lack of basic utilities. 
“Baghdad Daily” features on-the-street interviews to give the “common man” 
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view of current events in Iraq, particularly related to the security situation and 
the reconstruction efforts. “Your Place is Empty” focuses on the plight of Iraqi 
prisoners, a good number of which happen to be Arab Sunnis, showing the 
circumstances of the prisoner’s arrest by interviewing the prisoner’s families.11 
Although the Baghdad Satellite Channel’s shows are mostly religious in 
nature, some deal with culture, the arts, and sports. The channel imports other 
programs that deal with Islam, but does not feature popular entertainment 
shows such as soap operas or films, either imported from the region or 
internationally. 
5. MEDIA OWNED BY ETHNIC PARTIES 
Iraqi Kurds, Turkmen and Christian Assyrians have established their own 
ethnic media empires, with the Kurds having a “head start” as they have 
enjoyed relative autonomy in the north of Iraq since the end of the 1991 Gulf 
War. A sample of their media outlets is included in the Appendix. 
5.1 Kurdish Media 
The Kurdish satellite channels examined in this policy paper are The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) Kurdistan Satellite Channel, which began 
broadcasting in 1999, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s (PUK) satellite 
channel KurdSat. Both channels are non-profit and financed by their parties. 
While the directors of both channels stress that their stations have editorial 
independence from the PUK and KDP respectively, the content suggests that 
both channels serve as mouthpieces for the parties. 
The dominant frames in both channels are the progress of the Kurdish 
north, the ability of the KDP and PUK to provide security, support for Kurdish 
members of the government, support for a federated Iraq, with a northern 
                                            
11
 While most of the prisoners that appear on this show are Sunni Arabs, there are no 
accurate figures on Iraq’s prison population, so it is difficult to ascertain whether the program 
is accurately representing the prison population. 
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Kurdish state that includes the oil- rich city of Kirkuk, and victimization in terms 
of attacks by Sunni Arab militants referred to as “terrorists.” 
The content of the two channels owned by the Kurdish parties are similar 
in that they offer news about their political parties, events in the Kurdish areas 
of Iraq (referred to as the Kurdish Regional Government), and political and 
socio-cultural programs in the Kurdish language. On the KDP’s Kurdistan 
Satellite Channel, programs review the headlines from the Kurdish papers. 
The content of the political programs primarily deals with events of the KDP, 
while the political programs of the PUK’s Kurd Sat are devoted to the activities 
of the PUK. 
KDP channel programs dealing with social affairs range from “Hello 
People,” a call in show addressing social issues in the north of Iraq, to the 
locally-produced “Kamo,” a children’s show hosted by a puppet. Social-
cultural programs on the PUK include shows such as “Kultur we 
Rawshangari.” An example of programming that is influenced from abroad is 
“Star Kurd,” an entertainment music show. 
6. MEDIA OWNED BY ENTITIES CALLING 
FOR VIOLENCE 
Though the Iraqi media described in the preceding sections belong to ethno-
sectarian factions, and at times expose sectarian tensions and give the 
impression that their communities are under attack, they usually call for 
restraint and national unity, and do not specifically exhort viewers to engage in 
violence. However, at least one channel has recently emerged that not only 
calls upon Iraqis to take part in violence, but also serve as a means for 
insurgent groups to publicize their attacks. 
6.1 The Case of Al-Zawra 
Al-Zawra satellite channel emerged first as a satellite entertainment channel 
that also served as a mouthpiece for the Iraqi politician Mish’an al-Juburi 
during his parliamentary bid during the December 2005 elections. With his 
IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI: THE DYNAMICS OF IRAQ’S MEDIA 
 25 
expulsion from the Iraqi National Assembly, this channel eventually evolved 
into a platform for insurgents. 
The channel’s slogans include “Al-Zawra, The Voice of the Excluded and 
Marginalized,” and “Al-Zawra, Favors the Nation, The Nation as a Whole.” The 
station does not have a fixed schedule, but rather regularly airs videos 
produced by the insurgents, with footage of attacks against multinational 
forces. After a government crackdown, old footage was looped continuously, 
24 hours a day. 
The channel is privately owned by the family of Mish’an al-Juburi. Mish’an 
comes from the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, from the Juburi tribe. He was a 
member of the Ba’ath Party, and became the leader of the post-2003 Arab 
Front for Reconciliation and Liberation and a parliamentarian in the post-war 
National Assembly. He later fled Iraq on charges of embezzlement. His son 
Yazin al-Juburi is the managing director of the station and has been the target 
of an assassination attempt. 
When former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s death sentence was 
announced on November 5, 2006, Al-Zawra featured videos and songs 
supportive of the outlawed Ba’ath party, as well as exhortations for Iraqis to 
join groups fighting the US “occupation forces” and the Iraqi government and 
its “sectarian gangs.” The Iraqi government ordered the station to be closed 
down on charges of “inciting violence.” The closure order came from the Iraqi 
Ministry of the Interior, which also ordered the closure of the less well known 
Salah al-Din satellite channel. The closure was justified by the Ministry, not 
under regulation of the Communications and Media Commission (CMC) but 
under the Anti-Terrorism Law, a distinction which Al-Juburi was sure to make 
clear in an interview with an Arab newspaper: “The decision to close the 
station was issued by the Interior Ministry and not by a relevant body, like the 
Iraqi Communication and Media Commission, which is responsible for 
granting transmission and frequencies licenses.”12 Al-Sharqiyya (an 
                                            
12
 Ma’ad Fayyadh, “Mish’an al-Jaburi lil-Sharq al-Awsat: Sana’ridh liqitat yu’akad tamthil bijitha 
Saddam,” (We will show a video to prove that Saddam’s body was mutilated), Al-Sharq al-
Awsat, January 14, 2007, 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issue=10274&article=4059 
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independent channel with Arab Sunni sympathies that will be discussed later) 
carried footage of Iraqi security forces allegedly raiding the offices of the two 
channels. 
However, the station has been able to circumvent the closure through its 
use of transnational satellites, and it is unclear where its operations are now 
centered. Mish’an claims that the station still has many centers in Iraq, 
protected by Iraqi “resistance groups.” Other conflicting reports claim that the 
channel is based in Irbil, in the north of Iraq, or in Syria. Both the Kurdish 
Regional Government and the Syrian government deny such claims. 
As al-Zawra has shifted its transmission tactics, its content has become 
increasingly incendiary. After the government’s closure of the office the 
channel’s content focused on footage of insurgent attacks against US and 
Iraqi forces. The channel produces its own announcements that directly incite 
violence by calling on Iraqis to join the “jihad” against “US and Iranian 
occupation.” It also attacks Iran reflecting a pro-Iraqi Arab Sunni sentiment 
that alleges Iran is aiding its coreligionists in Iraq. Announcements on the 
channel denounce the “crimes of Muqtada and of the gangs ‘Aziz al-Hakim,” a 
reference to Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the primarily Shi’a Sadr Trend, and 
‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the SCIRI group. The station calls upon the 
“free youth of Iraq” to join the groups that are “defending” the nation to keep 
“Baghdad free from the Safawis,” referring to the 16th to 18th century Safavid 
Empire of Iran, but meant as a derogatory term against Iraq’s Shi’a. The 
channel also features footage of what it alleges are “Sunni civilians” attacked 
by Shi’a militias. The channel’s discourse and that of its owner has reached a 
point where even Iraqis refer to a “Misha’an” rhetoric. 
Al-Zawra’s news anchors, a male, and a female wearing the veil, are 
dressed in military uniforms, and regularly read statements delivered by Iraq’s 
insurgent groups. Most of their news footage is provided directly by groups 
such as the Islamic Army in Iraq, an Islamist organization primarily comprised 
of Iraqis. It also carries relatively sophisticated documentaries produced by 
the insurgent groups, which feature English subtitles and are directed to 
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Western viewers. One documentary claims that an armed group “wiped out” 
an entire American unit; the same documentary claimed that 15,000 
Americans had been killed by improvised explosive devices. The station also 
carries video footage of attacks carried out by Nizar al-Juburi, who achieved 
notoriety in Iraq as the “Baghdad Sniper.” Foreign reporting of this channel 
has claimed that Al-Zawra is an “Al-Qa’ida channel.” However, though the 
channel often features grisly footage of insurgent activity, it has never aired 
videos produced by the Al-Qa’ida Organization in Iraq and its owner has 
declared that he refuses to do so. 
There are no statistics about the numbers of viewers of this channel, but 
there are scattered reports about viewer reactions in Iraq and the Arab world. 
In Iraq, parliamentary critics of the station have been vocal about the station’s 
content, and death threats have been directed to its owners. At the same time, 
one correspondent in Iraq quoted one of the channel’s young fans as saying, 
“I watch this channel every night. I don't like encouraging violence, but it is 
something unusual in the argument against the Americans. I am hooked.”13 
Another report states how a Saudi cleric has issued fatwas (religious 
declarations) encouraging Saudis to watch “the channel of the Mujahidin” 
(religiously inspired fighters), declaring that, “it teaches the art of jihad, a 
matter the youth of our Umma [religious community] desperately need.”14 
The Iraqi and US governments have made efforts to have the Egyptian 
satellite provider, Nilesat, shut down the channel’s satellite transmission over 
its transponders. More than a month after the closure of its terrestrial 
operations and offices in Iraq - in late December 2006 - Al Zawra began to 
broadcast what it claimed was new footage of “Iraqi resistance” activities over 
its satellite channel. By January 2007, Al-Zawra was broadcasting continuous 
footage of old jihadist videos. This suggested that Nilesat, bowing to pressure, 
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 Michael Howard, “Insurgent TV Channel Turns Into Iraq's Newest Cult Hit,” The Guardian, 
January 15, 2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1990545,00.html 
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 “Media Aid: Iraq’s Al-Zawra TV Serves as Insurgent Propaganda Vehicle,” Open Source 
Center (OSC) Media Aid, OSC Document: FEA20070202087288, December 17, 2006 to 
February 1, 2007. 
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had stopped transmitting new Al-Zawra broadcasts that it sent from 
undisclosed locations in Iraq.15 
Al-Juburi has claimed that the Egyptian government prevented Nilesat 
from broadcasting any new material. The Egyptian Culture Minister 
challenged this claim, stating “it is none of our business what the channel airs 
once it has booked its share in the satellite and has paid all fees due.” The 
chief engineer of Nilesat said that it was Al-Zawra which asked the satellite 
carrier to continue transmitting old material: “They asked us - please, when we 
don’t send, loop for us what you have.” In regards to the diplomatic pressure 
claim, the chairman of Nilesat denied ever receiving an Egyptian government 
request nor an American or Iraqi government request to cut the channel’s 
transmission. 
The Information Minister of Egypt stated that Iraqis had threatened the 
Egyptian diplomatic mission in Baghdad if Nilesat continued carrying Al-
Zawra. Some Egyptian sources claimed that these threats came from 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army. That led to the decision to stop 
broadcasting new material. This explanation does not explain why Nilesat 
continues to loop Al-Zawra’s jihadist footage, which the Iraqi government and 
Sadr’s militia would most likely still find offensive. Al-Juburi claims that the 
station (Nilesat) did cave into US pressure: “The Egyptians confirmed that 
they came under US pressure. Anas al-Fiqi, the Egyptian Minister of 
Information, admitted this, and Anas Basyuni, chairman of Nilesat directorate, 
agreed that US Ambassador in Cairo, Ricciardoni exerted pressure on them to 
stop the transmission of Al-Zawra.”16 
In terms of the effectiveness of Iraqi government actions, al-Juburi claims 
that the channel still broadcasts “from underground areas controlled by the 
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 Marc Santora and Damien Cave, “Banned Station Beams Voice of Iraq Insurgency,” The 
New York Times, January 21, 2007, p. 8. 
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IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI: THE DYNAMICS OF IRAQ’S MEDIA 
 29 
Iraqi resistance, especially in northern Baghdad all the way to Mosul and Al-
Ramadi, using mobile transmission equipment out of fear of the US forces 
shelling them.” He also claims that “Our six correspondents remain on the run, 
roaming the Iraqi countryside in a satellite truck, from which they beam their 
programming to an Egyptian satellite distributor called Nilesat, which then 
retransmits the channel across the Middle East.”17 Lawrence Pintak 
interviewed Al-Jaburi and described how his channel continued to operate: 
… his teams in Iraq have sporadically managed to feed video to Cairo 
“through SNG [satellite news gathering],” which apparently refers to the 
same kind of portable satellite dishes used by television news teams to 
transmit their material from the field. He says the material is recorded on 
a “server” in Cairo, then forwarded to Nilesat. “And it keeps transmitting 
even if we are not transmitting from Iraq,” he adds. Much of the footage 
is shot on inexpensive video cameras and cell phones.18 
 
In February 2007, Al-Zawra also began transmission on the Saudi based 
regional satellite system Arabsat, on the BADR-4 satellite.19 This means that 
audiences in Iraq as well as the greater Arab world can watch its contents. 
Misha’an al-Juburi has sought to broadcast the channel via European carriers 
such as Eutelsat in France.20  
The case of Al-Zawra represents a worse case scenario for the Iraqi 
media, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of punitive measures, such as the 
closure of its Baghdad office, in the face of new transnational transmission 
technologies. Essentially, this entertainment channel evolved into an 
insurgency channel. If such a scenario could emerge, it is plausible that a 
channel owned by other political, ethno-sectarian factions, or even an 
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independent channel, could evolve into a militia channel. For this reason, 
punitive legislation and action against media that incites violence is only a 
partial solution. Even the speaker of Iraq’s parliament declared that the Al-
Zawra channel incident demonstrated the dangers of shutting down a channel 
and called for media responsibility. The recommendation section in this paper 
suggest that the one of the solution to this dilemma rests in creating 
alternative media that can attract audiences through creative means of 
communicating national reconciliation. 
7. INDEPENDENTLY OWNED MEDIA 
There are several channels that do not receive funding from any political or 
religious groups, depending on advertising revenues and financing by wealthy 
Iraqi or Arab investors, as well as by foreign governments, and primarily 
broadcast entertainment programs. The independent satellite channels 
examined in this policy paper are Al-Baghdadiyya, Al-Diyar, Al-Fayha, Al-
Sharqiyya, and Al-Sumariyya. While the content of Al-Baghdadiyya, Al-Fayha, 
and Al-Sumariyya are directed towards an Iraqi audience, the channels are 
based in Cairo, Dubai, and Beirut respectively, due to the security situation in 
Baghdad. These channels are independent, but critics argue that due to 
sectarian ownership, Al-Baghdadiyya and Al-Sharqiyya have a Arab Sunni 
bias, while Al-Fayha has an Arab Shi’a bias. 
Al-Baghadadiyya’s director is Arshad Tawfiq, a former Ba’athist diplomat, 
who has stated that the station is financed by Iraqis. Al-Sharqiyya is owned by 
Sa’ad al-Bazzaz, the former editor of the newspaper Al-Jumhuriyya in 
Ba’athist Iraq. Al-Diyar is directed by Faysal al-Yasiri, a former media figure in 
Ba’athist Iraq, and the channel is partly owned by a group of Iraqis and the 
regional Arab Radio and Television (ART) company. Al-Fayha is an 
independent Iraqi channel owned by an Iraqi Shi’a businessman. Al-
Sumariyya is owned by a group of Iraqis under the rubric of CET 
(Communication Entertainment and Television), and depends on advertising 
revenues from both Iraqi and Arab companies 
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7.1 Ethno-sectarianism and Islam 
The aforementioned channels claim to be independent in both financing and 
content of any ethno-sectarian or political Islamist faction. In surveys 
distributed to these channels, when asked if they refuse to air any material, 
they indicate a refusal to air programming that incites ethnic or sectarian 
divisions. The stations seek to reduce tensions among Iraq’s ethno-sectarian 
political factions in various ways. For example, Al-Sumariyya does not carry 
live statements or press conferences of any Iraqi politicians, indicating the 
station’s effort to maintain its neutrality, and claims non-affiliation with any 
sectarian, ethnic or political party. It stays clear of the Arab-Kurdish-Turkmen 
conflict as well as the inter-sectarian Shi’a-Sunni conflicts as well. The 
channel does not carry religious programs; rather it usually gives summaries 
of statements of religious figures during its news broadcasts. While other 
channels carry state-run public service announcements calling for national 
unity, Al-Sumariyya produces its own announcements that call for peace 
among Iraq’s communities. The station also features on-the-street interviews 
with the Iraqi public, and interviews with program guests, who stress unity 
among Sunni and Shi’a. 
Al-Sharqiyya claims that it has no connections with any political, ethnic, or 
religious faction, and refuses to air any programming that encourages 
sectarianism. However, it openly supported Iyad ‘Allawi, a secular Iraqi 
politician during the electoral campaign in December 2005. The channel has 
minimal religious programming, and it airs programs such as the “The 
Horoscope,” an entertainment program that deals with astrology, which is 
considered a taboo in Islam. 
Al-Baghdadiyya stresses that it seeks to promote “the unity of Iraq and 
promote Iraqi culture” and it refuses to air any content that is “against” this 
unity.21 The channel urges Iraqis “to unite” through various advertisements 
and music clips and ensures that its guests include Arab Shi’a and Sunni, 
Kurds, and Christians. The channel has minimal religious content. In its 
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responses to the questionnaire, the channel claims to have sought to increase 
entertainment programs such as music shows and drama series that are not 
usually found on channels owned by Islamist parties. In fact, the popular show 
“Other Eye” brings in guests to discuss topics considered taboo from an 
Islamic perspective, such as local Iraqi superstitions, magic in Iraqi folklore, as 
well as hypnosis and exorcisms. Other programs that demonstrate the secular 
nature of this channel include “Shahrazad’s World” which deals with current 
fashion trends and beauty tips. 
7.2 Televised Violence 
Independent channels deal with violence in Iraq in different ways, with some 
highlighting ethno-sectarian fighting and attacks against US/Coalition forces, 
while others following a policy of not airing violent scenes. For example, al-
Diyar rarely shows live footage of the aftermath of insurgent attacks. Its news 
programs usually focus on domestic news, with anemphasis on social affairs 
rather than violence. 
Al-Sumariyya describes itself as “an independent satellite television which 
aims at showing the world the true face of Iraq, and not only images of 
violence.” While the channel depends on advertising revenues, other sources 
of financing come from Iraqi shareholders who insist that news programming 
not just focus on the violence, and support the station for its emphasis on 
entertainment as a means to take the public’s mind off of the bloodshed in 
Iraq. Lead news items on Al-Sumariyya include events occurring in Iraq, but 
the channel, like al-Diyar, does not show live coverage of the aftermath of 
insurgent attacks. 
In contrast, Al-Fahya’s news programs deal primarily with the security 
situation in Iraq. Additionally, it runs public service announcements 
highlighting anti-terrorist measures, like al-Iraqiyya and al-Furat. 
Of the independent channels, Al-Sumariyya employs the most 
neutral/objective language in its news programs. When presenting casualties 
among the Iraqi security forces, Al-Sumariyya uses the term “killed” as 
opposed to “martyred,” the term employed by Al-Fahya as well as by Al-
Iraqiyya and Al-Furat. While Al-Sumariyya refers to the insurgents as 
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“gunmen” and US forces as “Coalition forces,” Al-Fayha presents the 
insurgents as “terrorists”; Al-Baghdadiyya use the terms “armed men” and 
“occupation forces,” respectively. 
Themes of violence and post-war instability are also prevalent in 
entertainment programs on these channels, including satirical comedies, 
dramas and even music clips, discussed in the section below. 
7.3 Public Advocacy 
All the independent channels feature public advocacy programs. These 
programs offer the Iraqi citizen a chance to address constructive criticisms to 
the Iraqi government through studio interviews or on the street interview or 
viewer call ins. For example, Al-Sumariyya’s “Who is Responsible?” interviews 
Iraqi citizens on the hardships they face in Iraqi society, and then allow the 
invited guest on the show, usually a government official, to discuss how they 
are dealing with these problems. “Files” deals with lack of infrastructure and 
basic utilities, and questions both the national and state officials about these 
problems. “Behind You, Behind You” also highlights particular social problems 
faced by individual Iraqis. 
Al-Diyar also offers programming that deals with the daily hardships faced 
by Iraqis, such as lack of basic utilities and insecurity. Iraqis can voice their 
concerns on the news program “The Screen is Yours” which interviews 
random citizens on social and political issues that concern them. Al-Fayha’s 
“Hand in Hand We Build Up Our Homeland” is a news program dedicated to 
the reconstruction efforts and “What If You Were…?” features comments by 
ordinary Iraqis expressing what they would do if they were head of a various 
government ministry. This program deals with the shortcomings of the various 
ministries that deal with reconstruction and unemployment. The shows “Iraqi 
Testimonies” and “Bars” deal with the political conditions of Ba’athist Iraq and 
allows those Iraqis who were victimized during this period to relate their 
experiences. 
Al-Sharqiyya features programs that seek to aid Iraqis in need. “Materials 
and Labor” is a reality TV-type show where the station finances the repair of 
homes destroyed due to the violence in Iraq. “Blessed Wedding” is another 
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reality program that finds a young couple in need of funds to hold a wedding. 
The station then finances the ceremony and films the festivities. “The Ration 
Card” is similar to a lottery program where prizes are given out to the numbers 
associated with a family’s ration card, a system initiated during the UN 
sanctions period. This channel uses sarcasm to poke fun at political life in 
Iraq, and such satirical programs, often banned in the region, are quite 
popular in Iraq. One of the most well-known shows in this genre is “Karikatira,” 
a comedy skit program that finds humor in scenarios of post-war Iraq. 
Al-Baghdadiyya also uses the station’s resources to aid Iraqis. “A Drop of 
Hope” is a reality show where Iraqis with medical conditions are financed by 
the station for his or her treatment abroad. “Youth Chat” is a talk show which 
allows teenagers and college level students to discuss issues of popular 
culture such as film and television, and social issues that are of concern to 
them. It takes various issues such as fuel, electricity and water shortages and 
frames them in a comic matter. “The Dialogue of the Deaf” is a critique of 
Iraq’s social problems, with skits similar to Al-Shariqyya’s “Karikatira” that 
mock the political establishment. 
7.4 Global and Regional Influences and Local Reactions 
Al-Sumariyya’s programming is primarily dedicated to entertainment, including 
music videos and soap operas. Other series are imported from Egypt, Latin 
America and the United States, for example dubbed Disney programming 
such as the “Lion King” and “Aladdin, and Warner Brothers shows such as the 
young Superman series “Smallville.” One of the effects of globalization is 
evident in the show “Iraqi Star,” the local equivalent of “American Idol.” The 
advertising during this program generates significant revenues for the 
channel. Programs in a similar format include “Stars of Poetry,” a contest for 
aspiring Arabic poets. 
Al-Diyar is also primarily an entertainment channel (entertainment 
constitutes approximately 80% of its content). It imports foreign films and 
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comedy series, both American and Egyptian. Nevertheless, the majority of its 
programs, including local soap operas, are produced in Iraq.22 
Al-Sharqiyya was the first to respond to an Iraqi desire for entertainment 
that related to their daily lives, and what is an indirect acknowledgement that 
some were growing tired of imported series dramas from Egypt or Latin 
America. Most of its Arabic drama shows are produced locally and filmed in 
the Iraqi dialect. One of the most popular series it produced was “Love and 
War,” a soap opera detailing the lives of Fawzi and Fatin, a couple who lives 
through the March 2003 Iraq War and the ensuing post-war chaos. 
Like Al-Sharqiyya, Al-Baghdadiyya claims to be an “Iraqi channel for 
Iraqis.” It has made an effort to increase the number of Iraqi-produced 
programs and estimates that 90% of its programming is produced inside of 
Iraq.23 
8. IRAQ’S MEDIA AND THE REGIONAL 
SATELLITE ENVIRONMENT 
This policy report survey does not provide a program analysis of Middle 
Eastern regional satellite channels broadcast into Iraq, such as the Qatar-
based Al-Jazeera, the UAE-based Al-Arabiyya, the Iran-based Arabic 
language Al-‘Alam. While they have large audiences in 
Iraq, this report seeks to analyze those media that serve as a reflection of 
the factions and communities in Iraq itself. Nevertheless, the regional satellite 
channels do play a role in ethno-sectarian tensions in Iraq, and media policy 
will have to consider how to deal with the ramifications of ethno-sectarianism 
and how it is portrayed both in the Iraqi media and regional media outlets. 
The influence of regional satellite channels in ethno-sectarian tensions in 
Iraq was amply demonstrated in January 2007 during a heated exchange on 
an Al-Jazeera political debate program between an Iraqi Shi’a, Sadiq al-
Musawi, and the owner of the Al-Zawra channel, Mish’an al-Jaburi. The 
tensions began at the opening of the show when Mish’an offered a prayer for 
                                            
22
 Stanhope Centre for Media Research Questionnaire. 
23
 Stanhope Centre for Media Research Questionnaire. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 36 
“the soul of the martyred President Saddam Hussein.” Al-Musawi was 
immediately offended by this action as Saddam, whom he referred to as 
Mish’an’s “father,” “had killed Kurds.” Mish’an responded on numerous 
occasions “You are a Persian shoe!” Calling al-Musawi a “shoe” (qundara) is 
deeply offensive in the Iraqi culture, and he also alleged that al-Musawi’s 
loyalties lay with Shi’a Iran. In this case, not only did a regional channel 
potentially exacerbate tensions in Iraq, but also highlighted regional sectarian 
tensions. 
There are no statistics for the rate of consumption of channels like Al-
Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya or Al-‘Alam in Iraq. The studies that have been 
conducted have been by private firms for various clients. One of the 
recommendations in this study calls for a media consumption survey released 
to the public, so that one can better grasp how the Iraqis are consuming 
media in a time of bitter conflict. 
While this study focuses on how the dangers posed by ethno-sectarianism 
in the Iraqi media, this section demonstrates that ethno-sectarian tensions in 
Iraq can also be heightened by regional channels. 
9. THE FUTURE OF IRAQ’S MEDIA 
The Iraqi media has expanded since the end of the 2003 Iraq war. Citizens 
can have various outlets, such as talk shows, call-in programs, and man-on-
the-street interviews to express their desires, complaints and frustrations. 
Additionally, news makers and prominent members of civil society can use 
televised panel discussions to give their opinions about salient issues in the 
nation’s development. While most media in the Middle East serve as tools to 
legitimize the state, in Iraq various media outlets have assumed their Fourth 
Estate role by challenging the incumbent government for its shortcomings. 
Specific programs often carry out this role by highlighting the daily difficulties 
faced by the average Iraqi, with channels calling on the government to 
address their needs. Issues such as government corruption, poverty and 
unemployment may be taboo subjects in Middle Eastern countries with only a 
handful of state-owned channels; in Iraq various media address these 
challenges directly. Additionally, some Iraqi channels feature entertainment 
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(either locally-produced or imported), particularly humor, music and drama, to 
relieve the stresses of Iraq’s post-war society. All of these developments are 
positive indications for the future of Iraq’s media and for its civil society. 
Nevertheless, there are some disturbing trends emerging as well. 
Well before the 2003 Iraq war, the Iraqis were viewed by foreign media 
through a “tri-ethnic prism” focusing on divisions between Shi’a, Sunni and 
Kurds, while ignoring Turkmens, Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, Yazidis 
and Sabaens, as well as the country’s more traditional fault lines, such as 
class, rural-urban, religious-secular and tribal divisions within the three 
communities. It has been a fashion in the foreign media to essentialize Iraqis 
into three “ethnic” categories leading to erroneous notions such as viewing 
Iraq’s Shi’a as an “ethnic” group or neglecting that the majority of Kurds are 
also Sunnis as well. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the media sphere in Iraq suggests that 
past misguided observations have unfortunately become reality. Indeed, Iraq’s 
media are increasingly divided along ethno-sectarian lines, with an 
independent media competing for audiences that have grown weary of ethno-
sectarian media. One article refers to this situation as the “Lebanonization” of 
the Iraqi media: “With Iraq’s TV menu growing increasingly sectarian, it is 
possible to draw a parallel with Lebanon’s highly sectarianized hodgepodge of 
channels-linked directly or loosely with political parties-which regularly report 
sect-specific news.”24 The Iraqi media is pluralistic, but also fragmented. This 
plurality can be positive: the Iraqi media serve as outlets for all of Iraq’s ethno-
sectarian communities, regardless of political persuasion, profession or 
gender. Such developments are beneficial for Iraq’s painful transition to 
democracy. Marginalized groups who otherwise would have no means to 
communicate their desires in Ba’athist Iraq theoretically have the means to do 
so. 
However, there are negative aspects of pluralism when it emerges as a 
result of chaos. Media pluralism in Iraq allows for ethnic and sectarian political 
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groups to consolidate powerful media empires, including print, radio and TV, 
broadcast in Iraq and internationally. While there is freedom of the press, the 
freedom of journalists to cover a story or have access to information is 
severely restricted. Certain political parties are content when their media 
expresses their political platform, but will violently target journalists and media 
professionals who may report on news in a way that displeases them. 
Pluralism, without regulation, can also lead to the rise of media that can be 
abused as a means of encouraging violence. 
The ethno-sectarian control of Iraq’s media landscape reveals another 
trend in Iraq’s political dynamics - the lack of political parties running on non-
ethno-sectarian platforms that can transcend Iraq’s divisions. Secular parties, 
such as the Iraqi National Accord, the Iraq Communist Party, the United 
Nation Party, or the Independent Democrats Grouping, own newspapers but 
not satellite TV stations, the most widely consumed media in Iraq. These 
parties have not been able to rally enough followers and have faired poorly in 
Iraq’s elections. These parties simply do not have access to the funds that the 
ethno-sectarian political parties have. 
At the beginning of this paper, four phases were identified as necessary for 
the emergence of a conflict media: 1) a strong ideology, 2) control over a 
mass media, 3) psychological preparation to hate, and 4) a call to violence. I 
would argue that Iraq’s media ethno-sectarian media has entered phase 
three. This policy paper (and the appendix which outlines the reach of the 
faction in Iraq’s politics) demonstrate that the sectarian Islamist groups as well 
as ethnic parties are dominant in the Iraqi media. Following the bombing of 
the Shi’a Al-‘Askariyya shrine in the city of Samarra in February 2006, the 
various sectarian and ethnic media outlets escalated tensions but eventually 
called for restraint among Iraq’s communities. 
The content analysis of the various ethno-sectarian channels did not find 
coverage that directly demonized the other communities. However, each 
sectarian and ethnic group uses their media to demonstrate that they are the 
victims in Iraq’s ongoing violence. While they do not explicitly exhort violence 
against other communities, as would happen in phase four, their continued 
portrayal of respective victimization serves as a means of encouraging Shi’a 
Arabs and Sunnis to “defend” themselves in the ensuing sectarian violence. 
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After the 2006 bombing, for example, the Arab Sunni oriented Baghdad 
Satellite Channel focused its coverage on the Arab Sunnis killed in retaliation, 
while the Arab Shi’a oriented Al-Furat’s coverage focused on the actual 
damage to their sacred structure. According to one account, “Al Furat was 
even more aggressive, encouraging Shi’a to ‘stand up for their rights.’ On a 
Shi’a radio station’s talk show, one caller announced that those responsible 
for the attack were Abu Bakr, Omar, and Othman, the three first caliphs whom 
Sunni venerate and whom Shi’a reject as usurpers of the position that 
rightfully belonged to Imam Ali, the prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-
law.”25 
When a particular channel reports a violent incident in Iraq, as, for 
example, an Arab Shi’a militia killing an Arab Sunni family in their home, or 
when another channel reports on Arab Shi’a killed in a marketplace by Arab 
Sunni suicide bombers, neither channel directly calls for revenge against the 
other. In these cases, the channels may not even invoke the term “Shi’a” or 
“Sunni.” Usually viewers can identity the victims by the location of the attack, 
or the perpetrators by the method of attack used. A Shi’a channel will not 
specifically mention that they were the victims of “Sunni aggression” and vice 
versa, though that association is strongly implied, and often the location of the 
attack implicitly reveals the identities. For example, if Baghdad Satellite 
Channel states that the Abu Hanifa Mosque was attacked by mortar rounds, 
an Arab Sunni viewer will most likely infer that the rounds were launched by 
the Shi’a Mahdi Army from the adjacent neighborhoods. The respective 
audience members that feel victimized may take matters into their own hand 
in “self-defense,” which in most cases manifests itself in revenge attacks. 
Even if the “victimized” fail to act, the worsening security situation may 
generate support for their respective militias, and not the state, to provide 
protection. 
The biases and victimization in Shi’a and Sunni reporting was expressed 
by Ahmed Rikabi, an Iraqi journalist who has had extensive experience in 
post-war media. On the CNN program, “International Correspondents” he said 
in reference to the Iraqi media:  
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Well, the sectarian tension is so strong in Iraq today. And I think this guy 
whose name is Omar, it’s clearly that this is a Sunni guy, when he goes 
and tries to cover an incident in a Shi’ite area, he feels like one of the 
victims. He doesn’t go and feel like a neutral person covering this. And 
so is the case for the Shi’ite Ali, who goes to that Sunni area and trying 
to cover. You also feel the fear. He feels that those people standing 
there, they might kill him as well. So that probably also affects him 
somehow. I mean, whether he is very objective or whether he is very 
normal or neutral or unbiased, but he can’t help it that he’s got a certain 
name. And that name might get him killed. And that will influence his way 
of thinking or approaching the subject.26 
 
A month later, Al-Rikabi stated explicitly that the media in Iraqi has emerged 
as a tool of conflict: “We are witnessing a civil war. And this civil war is 
conducted by different religious groups and different political groups. And of 
course, the media is an extension of this sectarian violence we are witnessing 
today.”27 
If Iraqi ethno-sectarian media has reached stage three, it is laying the 
psychological groundwork for hating the other. To reach stage four, these 
factions would need to make direct exhortations to violence. If the security 
situation were to worsen, the other political factions would have the option of 
using their media as mouthpieces to exacerbate the conflict, by whipping up 
ethnic and sectarian feelings or even directing the conflict. So far, these other 
factions have used their media to stress unity among Iraq’s communities, but 
they nevertheless have the potential to instigate conflict with these means if it 
suits their interests. 
According to the author’s fieldwork on the media in Iraq, a common 
perception held amongst the Iraqi public, and even journalists themselves, is 
that different factions have used the newspapers, radio and TV as “tools of 
war.” As the Iraqi political parties rarely communicate directly with each other, 
they have expressed their grievances through the media, with some media 
discreetly encouraging violence against the incumbent government. While 
observers of the situation in Iraq argue whether a “civil war” has emerged in 
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Iraq, a “civil war of words” has at least emerged in the Iraqi media according 
to some Iraqi journalists that I interviewed. Most, but not all, of the journalists I 
spoke to were hesitant to be quoted by name. Saleh Al-Shibani, an Iraqi 
journalist, stated in regards to political factions who own newspapers, “Every 
party, every party leader, basically everyone who can afford it has launched a 
newspaper. And each newspaper speaks for the entity it represents, makes a 
claim to the truth, assuming the right not only to criticize but to insult its 
adversaries; this is particularly easy in the light of the legal void.”28 Another 
Iraqi journalist Muhammad Sahi wrote a critical essay in the Al-Zawra 
Newspaper, a weekly published by the Iraqi Journalists Association, unrelated 
to the Al-Zawra satellite channel. His article serves as a lament of the state of 
the Iraqi media. He writes of the media: “They not only increased sectarianism 
and deepened ethnicity in society, but also are responsible for the fading of 
the concept of nationalism and patriotism and their actual dimensions.” He 
cites a list of the vast array of media aligned to political factions, which he 
argues are “mere fronts, whose main goal is to promote the ideologies and 
ideas of their affiliated political parties and forces,” and that they “have 
confused the Iraqi citizens and created a psychological barrier, in one way or 
another, between them.” According to Sahi, the pluralism in the Iraqi media 
has divided, confused and enraged the Iraqi viewer: “This explains why 
conflicting news reports about the same event are being aired by various 
satellite television channels depending on their affiliation, a matter that 
enrages Iraqi viewers.” He admits that some channels are trying to avoid 
promoting sectarianism, but they do cover statements made by Iraqi 
politicians who he states are divided by “sectarian inclination that escalate 
sectarian tension and crisis.” Sahi’s final assessment of the Iraqi media is as 
following: 
Accordingly, the Iraqi street and viewers are being divided with regard to 
their favored channels and news coverage based on their political 
loyalties and inclinations. Hence, it is inevitable for them to adopt the 
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political discourse of their favored television channels and to act in 
accordance with the statements made by political leaders. The Iraqis 
have found themselves to be indirectly involved and supporting some 
political leaders or perhaps even among their followers.29 
 
Most of the plans to stabilize Iraq, such as that of the Iraq Study Group 
released in late 2006, suffer from one inherent weakness: they view the 
conflict in Iraq by primarily focusing on “hard power” or “hard conflict.”30 The 
purpose of this assessment has been to illustrate media’s potential as a tool of 
soft power, and to demonstrate that the pattern of Iraqi media development 
should be viewed as a matter of concern for Iraq’s long term stability. While 
attention on Iraq’s situation focuses on actually acts of insurgents groups or 
sectarian militias, one has to also realize that ethno-sectarian divisions, even 
if they are opaque, have proliferated in the tele-visual and print spheres as 
well, and have the potential of exacerbating tensions. 
This potential was demonstrated in the light of events that occurred in Sadr 
City in late November 2006, when multiple car bombs caused the highest 
amount of casualties in a single incident since the cessation of the war. The 
Iraqi government accused various networks, both Arab and Iraqi, of inflaming 
the conflict through their coverage, and threatened prosecution of these 
channels. The President of Iraq, Jalal Talibani, went as far as blaming the 
media for inciting the violence. The fact that government officials have been 
so vehement in their criticisms of various television channels and newspapers 
is an indirect acknowledgement of the power of the media. Their criticisms 
also reveal the challenge of dealing with the violence in Iraq that is fought not 
only on the streets, but also in the tele-visual sphere. The government sought 
to make an example of the Al-Zawra station in November by closing down its 
office. However, satellite television and the internet have proven that strict 
                                            
29
 Muhammad Sahi, “Television Map in Iraq; Iraqi Satellite Television Channels between 
Politics and Promotion of Sectarianism,” Al-Zawra, March 27, 2006, p. 2. 
30
 Iraq Study Group Report can be found at the website of the United States Institute for 
Peace <http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html> 
 
IBRAHIM AL-MARASHI: THE DYNAMICS OF IRAQ’S MEDIA 
 43 
punitive measures are ineffective in dealing with media that can be 
transmitted trans-nationally. 
Events in Iraq could stabilize and as a result the Iraqi media may not 
proceed beyond stage three. Nevertheless, in the long term, various ethno-
sectarian media outlets in Iraq still could prove problematic in another fashion. 
Rather than a media sphere, Iraq has ethno-sectarian media “spherecules” 
that have the potential to further the gap between Iraq’s communities, 
developing identities along ethno-sectarian lines and weakening any kind of 
national belonging. Additionally, these media “spherecules” owned by Islamist 
groups have the potential to increase sectarian nationalism in the guise of 
political Islam in Iraq. At the same time, there are independent media that are 
trying to provide an alternative to the ethno-sectarian media. The 
recommendations below are directed to internal as well as external actors as 
to how to prevent the Iraqi media from developing into a media that enhances 
conflict. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Izabella Karlowicz’s work on media development in post-conflict Balkans 
she offers recommendations over three phases: set up, implementation, and 
capacity building. This framework can also be applied to the Iraqi situation. 
While the post-war Iraqi media has passed the “set up phase,” there are still 
some important recommendations that can be made that were ignored in the 
first phase. In the case of the Balkans, Karlowicz’s recommendations are 
designed to highlight “the dangers of poorly planned assistance to the 
development of the Fourth Estate in post-conflict areas, which may cause an 
outburst of ethnic conflict rather than fostering peaceful cohabitation.”31 An 
“outburst of ethnic conflict,” or in the Iraqi case, “ethno-sectarian conflict,” has 
become a reality. The media should emerge as a “safety valve” for the nation 
by ensuring that these differences are debated on the airwaves, rather than in 
the streets. The key for the future of Iraq's stability is using the media to 
                                            
31
 Karlowicz, p. 127. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 44 
address the grievances of all of Iraq’s ethno-sectarian communities, thus 
transforming this debate into a constructive one. 
1. Assess the Iraqi Media Landscape 
Any attempt at making recommendations should first begin with an 
assessment of the Iraqi media landscape for local and international 
organizations. 
1) Create a National Media Directory 
An Iraqi or international organization should compile a comprehensive 
national directory ofall local media (radios, newspapers, terrestrial TV 
stations). This step is crucial as most media in Iraq developed in the post-war 
chaos, before the establishment of any regulatory or licensing body. Such a 
directory should provide an assessment of which media have a proven record 
of promoting ethno-sectarian tensions, and will be a useful guide for 
international donors. This policy report concludes that the only satellite 
channel that can be considered entirely non-partisan and non-sectarian is the 
Al-Sumariyya channel, and local Iraqi media specialists and journalists have 
echoed this statement. 
2) Conduct a Media Consumption Assessment 
The Iraqi media landscape is changing quite dramatically. A second 
assessment needs to be conducted of Iraq’s media consumption in Iraq, 
including how many people watch a particular channel or specific programs on 
a channel, as well as channels from foreign countries. A local Iraqi body or 
international organization should take the initiative in commissioning a survey 
of the Iraqi media consumption. While such surveys are costly, a set of 
regularly updated surveys should be shared publicly as a common database 
for Iraqi actors, regional media organizations and international donors to 
better assess the media environment. Reputable agencies such as InterMedia 
have conducted media surveys for specific clients. One of the weaknesses of 
this paper is that while various private surveys, plus interviews with local 
journalists, indicate that consumption of ethno-sectarian media is on the rise 
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in Iraq, reliable statistics on Iraqi audience preferences and media 
consumption are lacking. Such trends need to be documented in a proper 
survey to help both local and international actors and policymakers in devising 
the most effective strategy to prevent the emergence of a media that 
encourages violence or at least provide a viable alternative. 
3) Conduct an Audience Research Survey 
There are no reliable statistics of audiences in Iraq. Audience research can 
determine how age, location, and income affect media consumption. Such 
information will be valuable to advertisers and boost the revenues of 
independent media in Iraq, thus strengthening an alternative to media 
dominated by political factions. 
2. Improve and Implement Media Regulation 
Bodies have formed in Iraq to regulate the media, such as the 
Communications and Media Commission of Iraq (CMC) formed in 2004. The 
function of the CMC is similar to the American Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) or the UK’s Office of Communication (OfCom). The CMC 
is a body designed as an independent regulatory authority for Iraqi 
communication industries, including television (both satellite and terrestial), 
radio, telecommunications and wireless communications such as internet. The 
CMC falls under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi parliament according to the 2005 
Constitution. In terms of this policy paper, the CMC is important as it is 
charged with establishing the framework and editorial guidelines for the 
content of TV and radio programs. In the past, these functions were controlled 
by the Iraqi Ministry of Information, with the Ministry essentially using the 
media to disseminate Ba’athist propaganda, so the establishment of the CMC 
is a positive step. (The Ministry was eventually abolished after the 2003 Iraq 
War.) 
Several recommendations can be made to the CMC and other Iraqi 
governmental entities. In Karlowicz’s study, she writes: 
In some countries where conflict was fuelled by ethnic hatred (e.g. 
Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo) an initial “hard hand” on the media 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2006/07 
 46 
may be necessary to stop further incitement of violence. Temporary and 
emergency measures such as a hate speech regulation, applicable to 
both the print press and broadcast media, may be necessary to keep the 
fragile peace under control. However, such measures should only be 
implemented at the very initial phase of the mission when journalistic 
self-regulation is largely absent.32 
 
The interim administration of Iyad ‘Allawi demonstrated its “hard hand” when it 
closed the offices of the pan-Arab channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya in 
August 2004 for “incitement to hatred.” It charged that these channels 
bestowed regional legitimacy upon the insurgents by framing them as an “Iraqi 
resistance.” Now, the Commission will also have to deal with the local Iraqi 
channels as well. 
1) Increase Awareness of Media Regulation in Iraq 
The CMC needs to increase its profile among journalists. The author realized 
that many of the journalists he interviewed had not even heard of the body. 
Other journalists have expressed critiques of the Commission, arguing it has 
not done enough. Sa’ad Al-Saraf of the Star TV Network stated in regards to 
the CMC: “Indeed, there seems to be a sort of ‘look the other way’ approach 
to enforcing the commission’s rules, such as the ban on ‘spreading sectarian, 
racial and religious sedition and strife.’”33 
2) Enhance the Existing Broadcasting Code of Practice, Create a Code for 
Reporting Ethno-sectarian Issues, and Further Fund the Monitoring Body) 
The CMC operates under an Interim Broadcasting Program Code of Practice 
that was inherited from a former CPA Order 65, which restricts media 
messages that “incite violence.” The second recommendation calls upon the 
Iraqi National Assembly to urgently deal with a draft law introduced by the 
CMC to replace the CPA Order. The CPA Order has a stigma in Iraq, as many 
would point out that it was those CPA Orders that called for the closure of 
Muqtada al-Sadr’s outspoken Al-Hawza newspaper, which ultimately ended 
up only inciting violence between his forces and the US military. Passing this 
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law will give both the CMC and its codes more legitimacy in the Iraqi media 
environment. 
If this legislation passes, the “Interim” Broadcasting Program Code of 
Practice would presumably become “permanent.” The Code, as is, seeks to 
protect freedom of speech, as long as that freedom is not abused by inciting 
violence or upsetting ethno-religious dynamics in Iraq. However this Code will 
need to be more specific in defining what constitutes “incitement to violence.” 
Agreeing on this matter should be done with the CMC and with a body of Iraqi 
journalists so that such a code can be based on consensus. Such a Code 
must give concrete examples of how tele-visual media in the past have 
“incited violence.” Second, such a code should specify the punishments that 
will be meted out to channels that intentionally incite violence. Additionally this 
Code should acknowledge how ethno-sectarian violence may be encouraged 
indirectly by the media, particularly by giving concrete examples, and indicate 
that equal punishments will be incurred for such infractions. The court system 
in Iraq is inundated with cases, so a special body for media arbitration should 
be created for the media outlets to settle media related disputes. 
While enhancing the existing Code of Practice will be a positive step, this 
policy paper recommends creating a specific Code for Media Reporting on 
Ethno-sectarian Issues. This recommendation is based on a past precedent 
where the CMC created a Code for Media during Elections, which laid out 
rules on how the Iraqi media should cover the 2005 electoral campaigns. 
Creating a separate Code for Ethno-sectarian Issues will demonstrate that the 
CMC acknowledges the problem, and is serious about resolving it. An 
educational film would provide the opportunity for live examples of media in 
the past that conducted unfair reporting, spread rumors, or incited violence, 
directly or indirectly. 
The question remains as to how to prevent ethno-sectarianism in the Iraqi 
media, while still allowing for free speech. The first step is for the CMC to 
elaborate on a code of ethica journalistic practices when reporting on ethno-
sectarian issues. Such a code will demonstrate to all Iraqi media outlets that 
the CMC’s actions are based on a set of values reached by consensus, rather 
than arbitrary sanctions imposed by an organization akin to the former 
Ministry of Information. 
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In order to ensure that stations comply with this code, the CMC will have to 
ensure continuous monitoring of the Iraq media. The CMC has an established 
Monitoring and Research Department which surveyed the media during the 
elections to ensure compliance with their elections reporting code. The 
relevant entities in the Iraqi legislature should increase funding to the CMC so 
it can expand this Department to carry out this monitoring task. In the long 
term, this Department should make public the findings of this body, with 
regards to the media’s incitement of ethno-sectarian tensions, as well as issue 
a report of media seeking to defuse tensions. 
3) Apply Specific Measures to Deal with Ethno-sectarian Media 
The government and the CMC should adopt measures making special 
provisions for political, sectarian and religious broadcasters. License renewal 
can be connected to requirements that these channels have a board or staff 
that are heterogeneous. These stations could be required to include 
programming that reflects Iraq’s ethno-sectarian mix in a positive manner. 
3. Increase International Assistance 
1) Create an Iraqi Media Loan Fund 
International donors and NGOs have aided with media development projects 
and this trend should continue. A loan fund should be established to develop 
support, capacity building and training for non-partisan media in Iraq. An 
example of such an initiative includes the South African Media Development 
Fund which was developed in conjunction with the Free Voice of the 
Netherlands and Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA). 
2) Create an Iraqi Media Development Network 
International actors have made positive contributions to the Iraqi media. 
Various ministries of the governments of the UK, Germany and the Czech 
Republic have offered assistance to the developing media in Iraq. Al-Mirbad 
Radio and TV in the south of Iraq was established with a grant from the UK 
Department for International Development, with the BBC World Service Trust 
providing training and infrastructure needs. The German Foreign Ministry 
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sponsored Telephone FM, a youth program produced in Germany and then 
broadcast by FM stations in Iraq. The independent news outlet Aswat Al-Iraq 
was established with aid from the Reuters Foundation and UNDP. The 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and International Media 
Support (IMS) have been active in developing the Iraqi media. Other NGOs 
have had experiences in training Iraqi practitioners in Jordan, while others are 
seeking to develop Iraq’s cultural, entertainment and film media. These 
various actors should “pool” their expertise together in a common network so 
that each party benefits from the others’ experiences with the Iraqi media. 
4. Improve Media Education 
The solutions to the status quo in the Iraqi media landscape cannot solely rest 
with legislation against media outlets that incite hatred. Media regulation does 
not solve the problem of educating journalists on social responsibility and 
reporting during times of conflict. One of the problems in Iraq is that 
professional standards and practical training for journalists are relatively new 
in a society that repressed its media in the past. Though journalism schools 
existed during the Ba’athist era, instruction focused on promotion of the views 
of the Ba’ath Party. Under the circumstances of ethno-sectarian reporting in 
Iraq, international media organizations should raise awareness of international 
standards in journalism to local media practitioners. 
1) Improve Training for Iraqi Media Practitioners 
In a survey distributed to the Iraqi radio and TV channels, the most common 
request was the need for “technical training of their staff.” Often media 
stations in Iraq would receive donations of high-tech equipment that their staff 
did not know how to use. Granted, the security situation makes such future 
cooperation difficult in the country itself, as foreign trainers may be hesitant to 
travel to Iraq. Such difficulties can be overcome by holding workshops abroad 
to train Iraqis to serve as media trainers once they have returned to Iraq. 
International assistance should be dedicated to financing Iraqis to take part in 
these training sessions abroad. Training should include technical matters and 
issues of media law and ethics, such as those offered at the Program for 
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Comparative Media Law and Policy at Oxford University 
(http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/ ). 
2) Improve Local Media Educational Institutions 
International assistance should also be directed towards developing the 
institutional capacity of Iraqi media. Education in these institutions could focus 
on how journalists can conduct balanced reporting at a time when their nation 
is on the brink of a “civil war,” and thus create an alternative to an ethno-
sectarian media. Baghdad University’s College of Mass Communications, as 
well as other Iraqi universities with Communications departments, are in 
desperate need of updated technical equipment. Faculty at these universities 
can benefit from intellectual development by revising their syllabi and 
curricula; this process can be facilitated by hosting Iraqi media professors in 
foreign universities. 
Outside of the university system, most media practitioners agree that an 
independent institute should be created in Iraq to offer professional and mid-
level training to Iraqi media practitioners. In this capacity, international donors 
can offer financial and technical expertise for establishing such an institution. 
5. Protect Iraqi Journalists 
A free and pluralistic media cannot emerge when the journalists are 
themselves targets of the violence they seek to cover. Improving education for 
Iraqi journalists may seem like a moot point, when once they have acquired 
their skills they could be targeted in Iraq’s ensuing violence. Protecting Iraqi 
journalists would seem to be crucial, yet it is most complex, as it involves 
security organizations not necessarily involved with media. The plight of the 
independent journalist in Iraq in between conflicting ethno-sectarian media 
should be emphasized. Refusing to comply with pressures from competing 
political factions to portray a party in a positive or negative light can result in 
significant dangers. Organizations such as the International Federation of 
Journalists have called on the Iraqi and US governments to make a 
commitment to protecting journalists and freedom of the press, as well to bring 
to justice those who target journalists in violent attacks. Yet, the question is 
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how to protect journalists, if the Iraqi security forces can barely protect 
themselves? Iraqi journalists could embed with Iraqi security forces, but that 
may also make them a target, or influence their reporting. Given the current 
security situation in Iraq, an independent/NGO/international organization 
should develop a standardized program that deals with reporting in conflict 
zones and offers training for Iraqi journalists to learn to better protect 
themselves while covering potentially dangerous topics or areas. 
6. Create a “Peace Media” Alternative 
While this policy paper has highlighted how media have emerged as powerful 
tools in increasing awareness of ethno-sectarian divisions in a deeply-divided 
society, it has also shown that they have the potential to shape and influence 
public attitudes in overcoming tensions. The media can channel 
communication between parties and serve a dialogical role in the ethno-
political context, ultimately building confidence between parties. The cases of 
such a “peace media” are rare, yet there are organizations that can offer 
advice to Iraqi journalists on how to create such a media. 
1) Learn From Other Applied Experiences in Peace Media 
The NGO Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has had extensive experience 
in creating “peace media” and offers three strategies for transforming the 
media in areas of conflict. First, they advocate the media playing a role where 
they deliver a free flow of accurate and constructive information and 
counteracting misperceptions. Second, they suggest that the media can build 
confidence and mediate between conflicting parties by fostering dialogue and 
communication between the parties. Finally, they state how the media can 
serve a “watchdog” role, or as instruments of early warning for the potential 
escalation of a conflict. 
SFCG also advocates a holistic approach to societies where conflict has 
occurred or has the potential to break out. In their opinion, addressing only 
media institutions fails to bring in other actors who have a role in the conflict. 
They stress that a sustained effort to transform a conflict has to involve efforts 
to change the mentalities of individuals, as well as societies, and thus they 
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seek to involve governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
businesses (including media owners), public opinion leaders, academics and 
marginalized sections of the society into their programs.34 
The Search for Common Ground techniques include holding training 
workshops for media practitioners in African countries such as Angola, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra 
Leone, the Balkans in Macedonia and Albania as well as the Middle East, Sri 
Lanka, Cyprus and its Greek-Turkish project. Their assistance focuses on 
three different aspects of local media structures in conflict zones that seek to 
create a media culture that allows for a variety of opinion, provide professional 
training for journalists, and provide equipment to local media. 
2) Develop a Peace Media Strategy 
The following techniques adopted by Search for Common Ground should be 
applied inside of Iraq. 
• Workshops on dialogue facilitation and collaboration for Iraqi media 
practitioners 
• Workshops to educate journalists, station owners and producers on how 
to defuse inflammatory coverage 
• Training local journalists and students in conflict resolution skills using 
various media and materials 
• Joint media projects between the various ethno-sectarian groups 
• Facilitating meetings between owners of independent and ethno-
sectarian media 
• TV and Radio programs fostering dialogue and cooperation between 
journalists from different ethno-sectarian groups 
• Documentaries about initiatives that bring ethno-sectarian groups 
together 
• Drama series that use entertainment to convey themes of ethno-
sectarian cooperation 
• Programming for children that deals with these themes 
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3) Focus Attention on the Entertainment 
Peace media strategies should focus on entertainment, such as films, drama 
series and comedies, as these programs can reach wider audiences and 
provide a release from the daily violence in Iraq. Entertainment that can 
include fictional characters representing all of Iraq’s communities, as well as 
actors from Iraq’s ethno-sectarian mosaic, can provide a tele-visual alternative 
for the Iraqi public to the news of continued inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian 
strife. 
4) Provide Literature on Peace Media 
Existing material on peace media and journalism is primarily in English. Useful 
articles and handbooks should be translated into Arabic, Kurdish and Turkish 
to be distributed at media institutions and educational facilities. 
This paper demonstrates that the media landscape in Iraq is at a juncture 
where it has the potential to exacerbate the ethno-sectarian tensions that 
already exist. Rather than waiting for the media to turn into instruments of 
hate, the policy recommendations in this report are essentially proactive 
measures that should be taken to ensure that the media can serve as tools of 
reconciliation, if not cohesion, rather than further distancing these 
communities. 
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OF ETHNO-
SECTARIAN MEDIA IN IRAQ 
Political Islamist Media 
Arab Shi’a Media 
 
SCIRI 
• Al-‘Adala (Justice) daily paper 
• Al-Wahdah (Unity) weekly paper 
• Al-Ghadir radio station 
• Al-Furat (The Euphrates) satellite channel 
 
The Da’wa Party 
• Al-Da’wa (The Call) daily paper 
• Al-Bayan (Announcement) weekly paper 
• Al-Masar radio station 
• Al-Masar TV channel 
 
Sadr Trend 
• Ishraqat al-Sadr daily paper 
• Al-Hawza al-Natiqa (The Active Hawza) weekly paper 
• Al-Salam radio station 
• Al-Salam TV station 
 
Iraqi Hizbullah 
• Al-Bayyinah (Evidence) paper 
 
Arab Sunni Media 
 
Iraqi Islamic Party 
• Dar al-Salam (House of Peace) radio station 
• Dar al-Salam (The House of Peace) newspaper daily paper 
 
General Dialogue Conference 
• Al-‘Itisam (The Guardian) daily newspaper 
 
The Unified National Movement 
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• Al-Sa’ah (The Hour) biweekly newspaper 
 
The Association of Muslim Scholars 
• Al-Basa’ir (Insights) daily newspaper 
 
Ethnic Based Media 
 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
• Khabat daily newspaper in Kurdish 
• Al-Ta’akhi (Brotherhood) daily newspaper in Arabic 
• Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan radio station 
• Kurdistan Satellite Channel 
 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
• Al-Ittihad (The Union) daily newspaper in Arabic 
• Kurdistan Nuwe daily newspaper in Kurdish 
• Al-Hurriyya (Freedom) radio station 
• Al-Hurriyya (Freedom) terrestrial Arabic TV station in Sulaymaniyya 
• Voice of the People of Kurdistan radio station 
• KurdSat satellite channel 
 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 
• Turkmenelli (The Turkmen Nation) daily newspaper in Turkish 
• Turkmenelli (The Turkmen Nation) radio station in Kirkuk, Tal Afar and 
Mosul 
• Turkmenelli (The Turkmen Nation) terrestrial TV in Kirkuk 
 
Assyrian Democratic Movement 
• Bahra al-Diya (The Light) newspaper 
• Ashur (Assyria) terrestrial Arabic TV station in Sulaymaniyya in Mosul 
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